As a byword for the current US administration's Asia policy, the Indian-Pacific strategy has received much attention over the past two or three years. But the United States and the rest of the Indo-Pacific have not agreed on such details as the coverage and how the strategy will be implemented. At last month's \"Indian Ocean Dialogue\" forum, Indian Foreign Minister Su-Jesson pointed out that \"Indo-Pacific\" is an open, free and inclusive platform for cooperation, with geographical coverage of the Western Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea. This exposition is clearly not on the same channel as the american version of the indian strategy.
As an international political concept, Indo-Pacific has emerged for more than a decade, but it has become an international hot spot only after the United States put forward the Indian-Pacific strategy. Objectively, concerns in the Indo-Pacific region reflect a rise in the strategic position of India and the Indian Ocean.
India's \"East Policy \"as early as the mid-1990s and upgraded to \"East Action Policy \"in 2014 aimed at strengthening economic cooperation with prosperous East Asia. At the same time, East Asian countries such as China, Japan and South Korea are expanding their economies and trade with India and the Gulf and African regions along the Indian Ocean. Africa and the Gulf have become important sources of energy, raw materials and commodity markets in East Asia.
The U.S. government formally proposed a \"Indo-Pacific strategy\" at the end of 2017, but its definition is a geographical range of \"India's West Coast to the U.S. West Coast area,\" and does not include the Gulf States on the Arabian Sea coast of the northern Indian Ocean and the African region on the West Bank of the Indian Ocean. The US version of the Indo-Pacific strategy requires only India, not the entire Indian Ocean and its coastal regions, nor is it intended to strengthen economic cooperation with the Indian Ocean's littoral states, essentially to woo India in response to rising China. The United States particularly wants to form a military alliance with the four-party cooperation between the United States, Japan, Australia and India as the \"axis \". In other words, America's \"Indo-Pacific strategy\" serves the interests of the United States and does not really consider the interests of India and other Indo-Pacific countries.
Now, India is clearly faithful to its own interests and intentions to shape the \"Indo-Pacific \". As a country with a tradition of non-aligned diplomacy, and now a big country that emphasizes \"strategic autonomy,\"India, if only follow the US version of \"India-Pacific Strategy \", not only harms its own great-power pursuit, but also risks undermining Sino-Indian relations. Instead, India has chosen to propose its own version of its \"Indo-Pacific policy \", strengthening its cooperation with East Asia through\" East Action \"and strengthening its cooperation with the Gulf and Africa to the west, highlighting India's position as a\" Indo-Pacific \"centre. This would not only enhance economic and cultural relations with other countries in India but also promote India's international status as an important participant in regional affairs in the Asia-Pacific region and as a dominant force in the Indian Ocean region.
It is important to note that any \"strategy \"or \"plan \"require commensurate resources to make progress, otherwise it would be a conceptual existence. Given India's many international and regional cooperation initiatives in recent years, such as the \"Monsoon\" and \"Spice Road \", but not much substantial progress has been made, it is also uncertain whether the Indian version of\" Indo-Pacific \"can achieve more results than the concept. However, even the concept is sufficient to have a significant impact on the United States version of the Indian-Pacific Strategy. The writer is director of India Research Center of Xihua Normal University.